This post is a part of the 2023 Selected Papers of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, which were edited and compiled by members of the CRE’s board alongside editors at Age of Revolutions.

By A. Claudio Man

Typically, the image of an eighteenth-century battle depicts brave soldiers marching shoulder to shoulder to the sound of drums and fifes. Yet, this picture, idealized in thousands of books and films, reflects just one dimension of the art of waging war. Behind the scenes, weapons and ammunition had to be produced and distributed, food and fodder shipped to regiments on the march, troops had to be paid, and convoys organized with medical supplies and equipment. Although recordkeeping has enabled experts to compare opposing armies in relation to the number of troops, cannons, or horses as well as in terms of the volume and quality of nourishment or general health, it is remarkable that logistics, a vital dimension of warfare, has been underappreciated by publishers and researchers. John Lynn, editor of the book Feeding Mars, attributes this to the apparent lack of interest in the subject manifested by readers.^[1]

The respected military historian Martin van Creveld argues that moving troops and matériel and keeping armies supplied is as crucial to warfare as battle tactics and strategy.^[2] In the same spirit, a popular quote proclaims: “Amateurs talk about strategy and tactics. Professionals talk about logistics and sustainability in warfare.”^[3] Moreover, in a memorable speech at the Académie Française, Jean Léopold, Baron Cuvier, reminded his audience that the quartermasters were not only responsible for the sustenance of thousands of volunteers who had joined the colors to defend la patrie, but that the needs of those patriots allowed no delays. Naturally, this added factor placed great strain on the men at the helm of the military administration.^[4]

Indeed, far from the frontlines, the destiny of armies and generals has been considerably influenced by anonymous public servants working long hours behind a desk. On many occasions, these bureaucrats were the actual organizers of victory or the root cause of defeat. In line with this fundamental idea, General Johannes Erwin Rommel stated: “The battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins.”^[5] Count Pierre-Antoine Daru, Intendant Général de la Grande Armée, and subject of this study, was one such men. 

The scope of a general quartermaster’s job could be staggering. The function was expected to procure, schedule, ship, transport, store, and ensure delivery of foodstuffs, brandy, fodder, arms and ammunition, artillery pieces, uniforms, boots, and medical provisions for multiple corps, despite the obstacles imposed by poor roads and unreliable vehicles. In addition, it had to review and approve vendor payments under critical time imperatives. With the limited means at their disposal and the primitive processes in place during the period, the expectations were, by definition, impossible to meet in a satisfactory manner most of the time. The mission, always at risk by a perennial lack of funds, generated frequent conflicts with the Treasury in Paris, local authorities, and army purveyors. It required from the appointees a full-time commitment, superb forward-thinking, sharp judgment for decision-making, and excellent communication skills. To no one’s surprise, incompetence, mistakes, corruption, and fraud were widespread across the supply chain.

Notwithstanding, Daru appears as a logical choice to illustrate the emergence of the modern logistician by virtue of his professionalism and influential career as a public servant. He could also be categorized as a forerunner of the present-day technocrat, analytical and data-dependent. He stood in contrast against most of his aristocratic predecessors of the ancien régime, who ran much smaller organizations and operated under the protection of the Court of Versailles. Recruited, promoted, and rewarded based on his talent, integrity, and ironclad recommendations, Daru served dutifully under different political regimes, reaching the zenith of his professional trajectory and influence under Emperor Napoléon I, who was undoubtedly a demanding leader and rigorous judge of character. In an era marked by the opening of careers in the civil service to talent and virtue, the expert logistician, father of the French army commissariat, came to represent the archetypical expert bureaucrat, later studied, defined, and classified by the German sociologist Max Weber.

Daru’s contribution to French victories and the critical role played by the commissariat in this consequential period should not be ignored. This exposition mainly focuses on Daru’s experience and contributions to the crossing of the Alps and the Marengo campaign during 1800, as well as his subsequent tenure at the Ministry of War. The main objective is to illustrate and emphasize the vital importance of the commissariat during the Napoleonic campaigns, as well as the emergence of a rational bureaucracy in the French government under Bonaparte’s leadership. Unsurprisingly, he was one of the emperor’s most trusted subordinates, a reliable advisor and confidant.

Daru was raised within a bourgeois family, loyal aides of the ruling aristocracy for generations. He quickly showed a natural talent for learning and applied himself zealously to his academic studies. In 1787, his father purchased for him a position as commissaire des guerres, a venal office at the time. However, the investment did not pay off, as he was forced to relinquish the post shortly after the Révolution. Despite this obstacle, following his apprenticeship, Pierre Daru started an impressive career as commissaire des guerres ordinaire in 1792 at the age of twenty-five and was quickly promoted to ordonnateur in 1793. Later, he held, among other positions, the post of divisional head at the War Ministry in 1795 and 1801, and inspecteur en chef aux revues pour l’Armée de Italie in 1800. In the nineteenth century, he was a member of the Tribunat in 1801, intendant général de la Maison de l’Empereur in 1804, intendant général de la Grande Armée in 1806, ministre secrétaire d’état in 1811 and ministre directeur de l’Administration de la Guerre in 1813 and 1815. Daru was appointed Comte de l’Empire in 1809, member of the Légion d’Honneur in 1813, member of the Académie Française in 1816, and Pair de France in 1819.

The firstborn of a career public servant elevated to the noblesse de la robe towards the end of the Ancien Régime, the future Comte fought his way up the rigid structure of the French army, redesigned after the Seven Years War by a wave of reforms propelled, among others, by Étienne François, Duke of Choiseul, Claude Louis, Comte de Saint-Germain, and Philippe Henri, Marquis de Ségur, requiring four quarterings of nobility as a condition for the appointment of officers. Freed from those restrictions after the Revolution, Daru became an important cog in France’s military machinery by his own merit. His partnership with senior officers, experienced quartermasters, and skillful diplomats catapulted him to the consideration and esteem of First Consul Bonaparte. A close look into the military challenges of the era illustrates Daru’s organizational skills, knowledge of army regulations, dedication, assertiveness, and integrity. These traits propelled him to new career heights, tracing an upward trajectory during a period of government upheaval and continuous war. The shifting fortunes of the campaigns in which Daru participated enabled him to gain valuable experience, surpassing his erstwhile superiors and peers. Significantly, the analysis also reveals Daru’s influence on the French military administration and the way his proposals changed its organizational structure and practices.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the First Republic faced significant risks threatening its survival. Following the celebrated Treaty of Campo Formio, signed on 17 October 1797, politicians in Paris hoped to divert the public’s attention away from a disastrous domestic economic situation to a prospective peace through victory over France’s European rivals.^[6] The means to that end included creating a protective cordon of friendly states along with territorial expansion in the Mediterranean basin, particularly in Egypt and the Levant. Unfortunately for French leaders, the plan did not work. The Directory faced escalating tensions with the Ottoman Empire and Russia after an expedition led by Bonaparte took possession of Malta and landed in Egypt in the summer of 1798, bringing Sultan Selim III into an unlikely alliance with Tsar Paul I.^[7]

In January 1800, following a challenging assignment as Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef at the Armée d’Helvétie, under General André Masséna, Daru was recalled to the Ministry of War, and given by Berthier the responsibility to lead the First Division, responsible for personnel. ^[8]  The field was well known to Daru since he had covered the position during his previous tenure at the agency in early 1797. Immediately, Daru devoted himself to a project favored by First Consul Bonaparte that would significantly impact the army’s administration: creating a new service, the inspecteurs aux revues.^[9] Towards the end of 1797, upon departing the Ministry after his first stint, the idea of splitting the administration of materiél from personnel matured in Daru’s mind.^[10] Indeed, he had outlined the final compte rendu prepared for Minister Claude Petiet’s signature, which he entitled Mémoirs sur l’Administration de la Guerre, precisely along those lines: personnel, materiél, and, for good measure, accounting.^[11]

Furthermore, the French army’s tribulations during the late revolutionary era stemmed in part from the immense workload assigned to the commissaires des guerres, who were responsible for procuring and distributing the goods and services demanded by the military, coordinating court-martials, and controlling the payment process while ensuring that the troops received their due compensation, promotions, and leaves. Daru’s efforts aimed to ease the heavy burden threatening to demoralize and discredit the army’s administration nascent professionalism. Accordingly, the new corps would assume all administrative responsibilities related to officers and troops previously managed by the commissaires des guerres or the État Major of the field armies. The Corps de Inspecteurs aux Revues was designed to be an instrument to improve the army’s governance and effectiveness, especially in the areas of recruitment, enlisting, dismissal and leaves, payroll, accounting, and controls.^[12] Nevertheless, this significant reform of the institutional structure, aimed at simplifying military administration, still charged the commissaires des guerres with the responsibility for interacting with vendors, managing the supply of all kinds of matériel, as well as with the oversight of military police, troop movements, hospitals, transport, and fortifications.

In addition, the commissaires des guerres retained other attributions awarded to them by the law of 17 January 1795, such as the administration of forced contributions imposed on enemy countries. The government designated 310 commissaires des guerres and sixty inspecteurs aux revues, among the latter six inspecteurs général en chef with a pay grade equivalent to a general of division.^[13] Notably, the ratio of military administrators to men under arms was still approximately 1:1,000 despite the expanded scope of responsibility and increased demands of war.^[14] Through higher remuneration and distinctive military honors, the inspecteurs aux revues were placed at a more prominent position in the hierarchy than the commissaires.^[15] Such distinction created tensions between these key functions, undermining the initiative’s chance of success. In addition, commanders of combat units resented the interference of any sort of inspectors or auditors, identifying them as an unwanted burden or agents of the War Ministry rather than a helpful resource.^[16]Nevertheless, the consuls sanctioned the law instituting the new organizational configuration, placing it under the direct supervision of the Ministry of War on 28 January 1800, thus reinforcing the political elite’s control over the military high command.^[17]

The first cohort of inspecteurs généraux was named on 7 February 1800. It included the “organizer of victory,” Lazare Carnot; Daru’s mentor, Petiet, as well as Generals Paul-Louis Gaultier de Kervéguen, Jacques-Pierre Orillard de Villemanzy, François Malus, and Jean-Baptiste Olivier.^[18] However, the title of general, assigned to the senior inspecteurs, caused major controversy, leading Bonaparte to eliminate it on 17 July 1800, recognizing the potential conflict with senior officers of line units.^[19] Simultaneously, Daru was named inspecteur en chef aux revues, one level below inspecteur général, with a remuneration equal to brigadier general. Still based in Paris, he kept his ministry office and continued overseeing the First Division.

Other significant reforms were implemented in that same year. On 3 January 1800, all personnel involved in the movement of artillery trains were militarized and the old system based on private contractors was terminated. This added yet another item to the lengthy list of responsibilities assigned to the commissaires des guerres allocated to the various armies. Daru assisted the newly appointed Inspecteur Général de l’artillerie, François-Marie d’Aboville with the incorporation and amalgamation of drivers and artillery teams into the army.^[20]

Yet, in March 1800, the Ministry of War issued new instructions. Every three months, a mandatory review of all troops was required, returning to an old practice last reintroduced in 1776.^[21] In addition, every ten days, the army inspectors were asked to submit a report that helped monitor the number of men under arms and control expenditures. 

However, the demand for individuals with the knowledge, experience, and integrity of Petiet or Daru was so high that neither could conduct a long-term program of reforms or remain long at the same post. Soon, Petiet was summoned to assist with arming and supplying the newly created Armée de Réserve. This force, consisting of three corps d’armée of two divisions each, established at the behest of Bonaparte, was initially placed under Alexandre Berthier’s command, who left his post as Minister of War and was replaced by Carnot.^[22] Originally based at Dijon and 60,000 men strong, the new army was comprised of volunteers or soldiers with little combat experience. Recruitment and amalgamation were entrusted to General Guillaume-Mathieu Dumas, a competent military planner who had been aide-de-camp to Jean-Baptiste-Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau during the American Revolutionary War. Dumas, a fellow Montpelliérain, became Daru’s close associate, eventually sharing with him the vicissitudes of multiple military campaigns.

The Armée de Reserve was flexibly positioned to be deployed either on the Rhine frontier or in Italy. However, the political and military developments in Liguria, Lombardy, and Piedmont convinced Bonaparte to move into northern Italy via Switzerland. He sought to emerge from the Alps and strike the rearguard of the Austrian army that had smashed through the Cisalpine Republic and was moving south, threatening the Ligurian Republic, another French puppet state.^[23]

On 4 May 1800, Daru left Paris and joined Dumas and Petiet to manage the Armée de Reserve’s administration. He was accompanied by his brother, Martial, and his cousin, Henri Beyle, better known by his nom de plume, Stendhal. In mid-May, Bonaparte took command of the force as it deployed to Geneva. Petiet and Daru moved forward with the army while Dumas remained behind at Dijon to organize an additional army corps. In this new campaign, Daru played a crucial role in executing the First Consul’s plans, jointly with Commissaires Ordonnateurs Jean-Daniel Mathieu Boinod and Jacques Dubreton.

Logistical arrangements were critical to crossing the Alps successfully.^[24] The needs of man and horse, such as footwear, biscuits, and forage, were covered by contributions from the local population. Additional requisitions made in Lausanne and Chambéry were transported by mules taken from the area. Moving artillery and ammunition over the mountains was the biggest challenge. A young general, Auguste-Frédéric-Louis Viesse de Marmont, coordinated the transportation of the artillery.^[25] In the meantime, the Austrians had fanned 120,000 men across northern Italy, threatening to cross the Var River and enter France proper with their right wing.

The city of Genoa, defended by Masséna’s starving and depleted Armée d’Italie, had been under siege since 6 April 1800 by the troops commanded by the Hungarian General Peter Karl Ott von Bátorkéz. The latter reported to General Michael Friedrich Benedikt von Melas, Commander in Chief of the Austrian Army of Italy. The circumstances had compelled Masséna to separate from General Louis-Gabriel Suchet, whose forces had established a defensive line along the Var River.^[26]

Since a sizable part of the Austrian army in Italy was facing Suchet and Masséna, Bonaparte had the element of surprise as he descended from the Great Saint Bernard Pass on 20 May. In the process, the French captured several warehouses and depots storing critical provisions destined for the Austrian army. The bounty had the double benefit of replenishing the French depots with much-needed victuals while depriving the Austrians of valuable supplies at a critical moment in the campaign. Despite a significant setback at Montebello on 9 June, Melas launched a counteroffensive from Alessandria to reopen his now severed line of communications and supplies. On 14 June 1800, near the village of Marengo, an early Austrian success turned into a débâcle by a late afternoon counterattack initiated by General Louis-Charles-Antoine Desaix.

This second French victory in less than one week convinced Melas to evacuate northern Italy to save the remnants of his army. Berthier drafted an armistice, the Convention of Alessandria, which was signed on 15 June 1800.^[27] Article XII of the Convention established a commission to oversee the execution of the agreement and conduct the necessary evacuations and inventory of provisions and military matériel; Daru was appointed to the commission.

The French representatives were selected in line with Bonaparte’s instructions and comprised of experts in all vital aspects covered by the Convention: artillery, fortifications, and matériel.^[28] For the first time, Daru was placed, jointly with senior officers, in the delicate position of controlling and implementing an international settlement. His primary role was to perform combined inventories of supplies and munitions, allocate them between the parties, and inspect the fortresses. In addition, he had to ensure compliance with the evacuation of strongholds on specific dates and the redeployment of troops as defined in the agreement.^[29]

Daru took a leading role in assuring compliance with the Convention of Alessandria, as attested by the rich documentation curated by the French Archives Nationales.^[30] For example, as commissaire for the execution of the Convention, he interacted frequently and regularly with senior officers of both armies, lower-level administrators of military depots, and municipal warehouses, including civilian authorities. Daru’s knowledge of Italian and German helped with communications, and by the fall of 1800, the principal dispositions of the agreement were in place.^[31]

Daru’s frequent correspondence with General Dejean, the French representative at Genoa; Petiet, the French Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Cisalpine Republic; Berthier, Chief of Staff, and Masséna, commander of the Armée d’Italie, reflect the higher status and influence achieved by the Montpelliérain.^[32] During the last months of 1800, he became France’s leading military administrator (Intendant de l’armée) in Italy. All commissaires des guerres in the region reported to him. From that moment on, he became a prominent member of the administration while sharing with his brother Martial and his cousin, Henri Beyle, la belle vie that Milan offered the victors.^[33] Indeed, Daru had reached another important milestone in his career.

On 9 February 1801, Austria and France signed the Treaty of Lunéville, confirming the agreements outlined in the Convention of Alessandria and the Armistice of Parsdorf.^[34] On 24 February 1801, after completing his mission in Italy, Daru returned to the Ministry of War, led again by Berthier. As an advisor to the Military Committee of the Legislature, Daru had prepared a three-volume proposal to better organize the army during peacetime.^[35] Bonaparte invited him to discuss it at his home at the Château de Malmaison, approved it, and ordered its application.^[36] On 4 May 1801, Berthier congratulated Daru and agreed with the First Consul to prepare the regulatory framework to implement the proposal.^[37]However, just a few weeks later, in July 1801, Daru was appointed head of the Eighth Division of the Ministry of War, becoming First Secretary to the minister, and the execution of the proposed reforms was deferred.^[38]

During the period under analysis, Daru’s multifaceted evolution can be seen by the nature of his contributions as well as the complexity of his challenges. The young commissaire des guerres who began his career supporting an army fighting a domestic insurrection in the Vendée gave way to a seasoned military administrator implementing international treaties, pushing for major reforms, and influencing senior politicians. After ten years of grueling field practice, the veteran quartermaster could boast the conception of the function of Contrôleur de Subsistances in 1796, the creation of the Corps de Inspecteurs aux Revues in 1800, and the successful implementation of the Convention of Alessandria. 

Daru’s impact over men like Petiet, Dubois-Crancé, Masséna, Aubert-Dubayet, Dejean, Mathieu-Dumas, or Berthier, as well as the evolution of his career, was not the consequence of being at the right place at the right time. Rather, the result of a deliberate selection process achieved by consensus at the highest levels of the administration. In due course, Napoléon expressed his strong agreement with those early decisions, making Daru one of his trusted associates.

In sum, between 1800 and 1801, Daru consolidated his path from a highly accomplished aspirant to a mature, assertive, and influential military administrator. His father’s dream to see him as an haut-fonctionnaire, a top-level government official, had become a reality. Initially, Daru’s strong motivation and work ethic propelled him to the consideration of his superiors. Following the Marengo campaign, he had become a highly effective, knowledgeable, respected, and well-connected public servant. Critically, he was setting the standard for the archetypical professional bureaucrat. This role model would constitute the subject of numerous studies in public administration in Britain, France, and Prussia during the following several decades. Moreover, he had entered the new century leading the way in his critical field of expertise, designing and implementing major reforms in logistics and army administration that enabled the First Consul and future emperor of the French to undertake new campaigns, bringing his armies to the confines of Europe.

---

A. Claudio Man is a graduate student at the University of North Texas. His primary interest is in the military, diplomatic and political developments in the Western world from 1740 to 1945. He joined UNT in 2019 and is pursuing a Masters of Science with an emphasis in European history during the XVIII and XIX centuries.

Title Image: Portrait of Pierre Daru (1767-1829), by Antoine-Jean Gros. Pendant le Premier Empire, Daru est l’organisateur du ravitaillement de l’armée impériale. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Endnotes:

^[1] John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars, Logistics in Western warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (New York: Routledge, 2018), vii

^[2] Martin van Creveld, Supplying War, Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2.

^[3] The quote has been attributed both to General Omar Nelson Bradley (1893-1981) and to General Robert Hilliard Barrow (1922-2008). The latter mentioned it in an interview to a reporter of the San Diego Union-Tribune published on 11 November 1979. The point is designed to highlight the relevance of logistics and sustenance to an army’s success, as well as the complexity of the field.

^[4] Hubert Lyautey et al, L’Intendant Général Comte Daru (Paris: Imprimerie-Librairie Militaire Universelle L. Fournier, 1933), 33-53. Urgency as a decisive factor is cited by the Intendant Général Jean Pierre Georges Louis Rimbert (1871-1943), director, French Ministry of War, in a speech honoring Pierre Daru, pronounced, on 10 June 1933 included in a commemorative book published to mark the occasion. 

^[5] Lynn, Feeding Mars, ix. 

^[6] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 182-200.

^[7] Alexander Mikaberidze, The Napoleonic Wars, A Global History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 80. 

^[8] Nanteuil, Le Comte Daru, 18. The legislative commission in question was subordinated to the Council of Five Hundred, the lower chamber of the French parliament. 

^[9] The term can be translated into Inspectors of Troops. 

^[10] Michel Roucaud and Thierry Sarmant, “Une Institution Originale de l’administration Consulaire et Impériale: Le Corps des Inspecteurs aux Revues,” La Revue Administrative 58, n^o. 347 (2005): 526–39.

^[11] Mémoire sur l’Administration de la Guerre, sans-date Pierre-Antoine-Bruno Daru. Archives Nationales AP 138/4. https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_051115&udId=G5181&details=true&gotoArchivesNums=false&auSeinIR=true

^[12] Jean Milot, “Évolution du Corps des Intendants Militaires (des origines a 1882),” Revue du Nord 50, n^o. 198, (Juillet-Septembre 1968), 398. Among the first measures taken as a result of the deployment of the inspecteurs aux revues was the elimination from the payroll of 30,000 officers and privates, including 20,000 unaccounted for just in the Armée du Rhin.

^[13] “Mémoire sur le département de la Guerre adressé au Corps législatif”, sans date. Archives Nationales Fonds Daru AP 138/4. https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_051115&udId=G5181&details=true&gotoArchivesNums=false&auSeinIR=true Daru affirms that “La partie administrative de la Guerre se divise en deux branches principales, le personnel et le matériel.”

^[14] See chapter II, page 22.

^[15] The inspecteurs aux revues had priority over commissaires des guerres when marching on parade and more lavish uniforms.

^[16] Brown, War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State, 233-234.

^[17] Eman E. Vows, “Pierre Daru, The System of Military Administration and the le Code Militaire, 1805,” The Napoleon Series (March 2009).  https://www.napoleon-series.org/military-info/organization/France/Miscellaneous/c_FrenchMilitaryCode.html.

^[18] Bonaparte to Berthier, 5 February 1800 (16 pluviôse an VIII) in Suzanne D’Huart, éd., Lettres, Ordres et Apostilles de Napoléon 1^er Extraits des Archives Daru (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1965), 4. 

^[19] Roucaud and Sarmant, “Le Corps des Inspecteurs aux Revues” La Revue Administrative 58, n^o 347 (2005): 526–39.

^[20] Nanteuil, Le Comte Daru, 92.

^[21] Bergerot, Daru, 50-51.

^[22] The First Consul actually commanded the army but as a civilian authority was not allowed to exercise command over any army per the Constitution of 1800. He skirted this by making Berthier its nominal commander. 

^[23] The Ligurian Republic was a French satellite state created by General Bonaparte on 14 June 1797, following the model developed for the Cispadane and Transpadane republics in 1796. It was subject to a devastating blockade by a British fleet and the Austrian army in 1800.

^[24] Bonaparte à Petiet, Conseiller d’État, 15 Floréal (5 May 1800) pièce 4756 in Correspondance de Napoléon 1^er.an VIII, VI:322-23.

^[25] Charles Théodore Beauvais de Préau and Jacques Philippe Voïart, Victoires, conquêtes, désastres, revers et guerres civiles des Français, de 1792 à 1815 (Paris: C.L.F. Panckoucke, 1819), XIII:14

^[26] Charles Auriol, éd., La Défense du Var et le Passage des Alpes, Lettres des Généraux Masséna, Suchet, etc. (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie. Imprimeurs-Éditeurs, 1890), 148-151. The letter from general Suchet to First Consul Bonaparte dated 21 April 1800 (1^er. Floréal an VIII) provides a detailed account of the circumstances affecting the army.

^[27] Pièce 13. Archives Nationales Fonds Daru AP 138/26. https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_051115&udId=G5557&details=true&gotoArchivesNums=false&auSeinIR=true&fullText=138AP/26&optionFullText=ET

^[28] Daru joined the commission with Générals de Génie Jean-François Dejean (1749-1824) and Jacques-François de Brun (1762-1805), Général de Division Jean-Louis Mossel (1770-1848), Général de Brigade Jean-Marie De Stabenrath (1770-1853,) and the Austrian Generalmajor Jean-Joseph de Guyard, Comte de Saint-Julien (1758-1829).

^[29] Bonaparte to Carnot, Ministre de la Guerre, 11 July 1800 (22 Messidor an VIII), in Correspondance de Napoléon 1er. an VIII, pièce 4975, VI:503-04 .

^[30] Archives Nationales, Fonds Daru AP 138/14. https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_051115&udId=G5275&details=true&gotoArchivesNums=false&auSeinIR=true

^[31] Bergerot, Daru, 54.

^[32] Gotteri, Claude Petiet, 66. The author describes the close interaction between Bonaparte and Petiet during the days that preceded and followed the Battle of Marengo. As a protégé and close associate to Minister Petiet, Daru responded to the requests of the First Consul and joined the small circle of Bonaparte’s trusted collaborators.

^[33] Martineau, Le Cœur de Stendhal, 1:134-139.

^[34] The Armistice of Parsdof was signed on 15 July 1800 between French General Jean Victor Marie Moreau (1763-1813) and the veteran Hungarian commander Paul Kray von Krajowa (1735-1804). It ended the military operations between Austria and France in the German theater during the War of the Second Coalition.

^[35] Archives Nationales Fonds Daru AP 138/15. https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_051115&udId=G5297&details=true&gotoArchivesNums=false&auSeinIR=true&fullText=138AP/15&optionFullText=ET

The proposal was designed to standardize compensation, sustenance for men and beasts, uniforms, equipment, leaves of absence and other elements defined by ordinances regulating the armed forces during peacetime. The goal was to eliminate contradictory regulations, avoid inequalities and lower costs. They constitute a precedent to the military code that Daru spearheaded for Napoléon in 1805-1806. The following titles provide an illustration of the broad scope of Daru’s expertise: 1) Constitution de l’armée. Recrutement et avancement, discipline et récompense. 2) Administration des corps, service, écoles militaires. 3) Administration de l’armée: Habillement et campement, comptabilité des corps, solde et indemnités. Subsistances. Hôpitaux, casernement et chauffage.Remontes, équipages, convois et fournitures diverses.(see Archives Nationales Fonds Daru AP 138/17-21). https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_051115&udId=G5367&details=true&gotoArchivesNums=false&auSeinIR=true

^[36] Casimir Stryienski and François de Nion, ed., Journal de Stendhal (Henri Beyle) 1801-1814 (Paris: Bibliothèque–Charpentier, Eugène Fasquelle Éditeurs, 1899), 4.

^[37] Bergerot, Daru, 58.

^[38] Ibid., 59.