This post is a part of the 2023 Selected Papers of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, which were edited and compiled by members of the CRE’s board alongside editors at Age of Revolutions.
By Michael C. Hamel
Following the French Revolution, European powers banded together to defeat revolutionary France. Initially, Spain remained neutral at the start of the War of the First Coalition; however, the execution of King Louis XVI on 21 January 1793 made war inevitable. Given its shared border with France, Spain found itself in an optimal position to help restore the status quo after the National Convention – the third government of the Revolution – declared war on 7 March 1793. King Carlos IV responded with a reciprocal declaration of war on 23 March.[1] On 17 April, the Army of Catalonia, commanded by Captain General Antonio Ricardos, invaded the southern French province of Roussillon. In general, Spanish commanders have a reputation for having performed poorly in the Napoleonic Wars. This criticism is generally well-founded, given their lackluster performance. However, Ricardos proved to be an exception. He leveraged his expert generalship and tactical acumen to lead the Army of Catalonia to numerous victories against the French army despite limited manpower, equipment, and resupply.[2]
In examining the complex dynamics and outcomes of the Roussillon Campaign during the French Revolutionary Wars, this paper provides a granular, battle-by-battle analysis of the Spanish forces under Ricardos. While some historians have scrutinized Ricardos, attributing the ultimate failure of the campaign to his cautious nature and decision-making, this study aims to offer a fresh perspective, diving deep into the military strategies employed and the contextual challenges faced. Ramsay Weston Phipps characterized Ricardos as being “slow, and with many misgivings,” highlighting a tendency towards excessive caution.[3] Paddy Griffith, in The Art of War of Revolutionary France, offers an even more critical view, describing Ricardos’ approach as marred by “pathological indecision” and illustrating moments where decisive victories were within reach, yet slipped away due to hesitations and strategic retractions.[4] However, this paper seeks to contribute to the discourse by reevaluating these moments within the broader context of military logistics, the state of the Spanish forces, and the unique challenges posed by the French Revolutionary armies. By doing so, it endeavors to provide a nuanced understanding of Ricardos’ military conduct and to reassess the critical perspectives offered by Anglophone historians, shedding light on unexplored facets of this pivotal military campaign.
Despite the existing body of work on Ricardos and the Roussillon Campaign, this paper distinguishes itself by delving into previously underutilized Spanish and archival sources. Previous studies are now dated and predominantly rely on Anglophone and French sources, inadvertently maintaining a partial narrative of the events and strategies in question. This study enriches the historiography by incorporating Spanish military archives and contemporary accounts, providing a fuller and more balanced understanding of Ricardos’ generalship and the operational intricacies of the campaign. The level of operational detail presented here is imperative because the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era represent a transformative period in military affairs, paving the way for the modern age of warfare. A meticulous analysis of a lesser-known military operation like the Roussillon Campaign is vital for placing it within the larger context of these transformative wars, offering insights into the evolution of military strategy, logistics, and tactics. Through this approach, this paper not only contributes to a reevaluation of Ricardos’ military conduct, moving beyond the prevailing narratives of caution and indecision, but also enhances our understanding of the Spanish role and performance during the War of the First Coalition. By doing so, it challenges the existing stereotypes of Spanish military ineffectiveness during the Napoleonic Wars, offering a nuanced and comprehensive account of a campaign that larger and more famous battles of the era have long overshadowed.
Ricardos took command of the Army of Catalonia in early March 1793 but found it undermanned and unprepared for the coming war. In their failed bid to placate France the preceding year, the king and his ministers had refrained from placing the army on a war footing.[5] Upon assuming command, Ricardos’ forces numbered 25,000 at most.[6] In addition to manpower shortages, Ricardos’ army also desperately needed supplies.[7] It lacked the provisions, equipment, and munitions necessary to conduct an offensive.[8] Although Madrid planned on using the Army of Catalonia to invade France, little had been done to prepare for the campaign.[9]
Across the border, the French Army of the Eastern Pyrenees stood ready to prevent Ricardos’ incursion. The French government correctly viewed Spain as a lesser threat in its greater war against Europe. As such, the French army numbered only 21,089. Its mobile force consisted of 10,800 men, with the remainder divided among its border fortresses.[10] While the French were at a slight numerical disadvantage, French artillery dwarfed Spanish cannon in both numbers and caliber.[11]
While fighting from a defensive position, the French benefited from both terrain features and prepared defenses. The Pyrenees Mountains formed a natural barrier that would have a canalizing effect on any invading Spanish forces. Only one road, the Route of Barcelona, connected Catalonia and Roussillon.[12] This choke point alone would have proven troublesome for Spanish forces. Fort Bellegarde and its hornwork sat 200 meters above and 400 meters west of the road, which would leave an advancing army exposed to cannon fire.[13] Other forts further fortified the province. Finally, the walled provincial capital of Perpignan, twenty-five kilometers north of Fort Bellegarde, dominated the Route of Barcelona.
Map 1. Theatre of operations. The Road of Barcelona is marked in orange. Fort Lagarde is labeled as Prats de Molo.[14]
Ricardos planned his invasion for May, but events across the border convinced him to move up his timeline. One of his spies, a resident of Saint-Laurent-de-Cerdans, traveled across the border on 10 April 1793 and informed Ricardos of an imminent French reprisal in response to the village’s Holy Thursday procession.[15] The information forced Ricardos to choose between maintaining his operational timeline and saving the villagers.
Liberating the village held several potential advantages for Ricardos. First, it might garner the support of locals, easing the logistical strain on his forces. Indeed, his undersupplied army would benefit from being able to recruit local support rather than dependence on unreliable contracted porters.[16] Second, defending the village would allow him to maintain control over the mountain pass known as the Col Porteill. After the Route of Barcelona, this pass was the second-best route into Roussillon. Finally, Saint-Laurent-de-Cerdans could serve as a military staging point beyond the reach of the French forts. Thus, he could mass his combat forces while bypassing French fortifications. Despite not having approval from court, Ricardos ordered the start of the campaign on 16 April 1793.[17]
Ricardos invaded Roussillon with a vanguard of 3,500 men before sunrise on 17 April 1793. Rather than confront Fort Bellegarde, the Spanish traversed several mountain passes west of the fort and easily captured Saint-Laurent-de-Cerdans. Ricardos had secured his foothold in France less than one day into the campaign. After consolidating his forces, Ricardos pushed east and captured the towns Arles and Céret in the following days.
Map 2. Primary Spanish invasion route on 17 April 1793.[18]
With his foothold securely established, Ricardos moved to secure his lines of communication to transport his heavier artillery across the Pyrenees. Until this point, the soldiers had carried light four-pound cannon on their shoulders through the mountain passes.[19] While useful against infantry, such light cannon could do little against the walls of the French fortresses. Beginning on 23 April, 2,000 men worked to improve the Pass of Porteill.[20] Three days later, the first eight-pound cannon made its way through the pass.[21] With the path improved, Ricardos now had a route for procuring supplies and reinforcements.
However, improving the mountain pass only partially solved the army’s logistical constraints. Although men and cannon slowly crossed the mountains, the requisite supplies did not. The army, having already been poorly supplied in the months prior to the invasion, found itself without sufficient provisions, tents, munitions, and other supplies, despite Ricardos’ attempts to resupply prior to commencing his offensive. Moreover, the lack of mules slowed the influx of supplies to a trickle.[22] Lacking the sustainment necessary to continue his offensive, Ricardos reinforced his foothold and waited for resupply.
Less than one month into the invasion, the French launched a counteroffensive to pin Ricardos between their field army and the border fortresses. On 14 May 1793, French field commander General Louis-Charles de Flers reached the fortified city of Perpignan with reinforcements. To hold Mas Deu, a village just to the southwest of the capital, he sent General Luc Siméon Auguste Dagobert with 6,000 infantry supported by 300 cavalry and fourteen cannon.[23] In response, on 18 May 1793, Ricardos moved east from Céret with 7,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and supporting artillery to defeat the French blocking force at Mas Deu.[24] Initially, the entrenched French artillery found its mark on the advancing Spanish. In contrast, the Spanish artillery, consisting of a mix of eighteen light cannon and howitzers, failed to respond with effective counterbattery fire.[25] Despite the French guns, Ricardos pressed the attack with his three columns rather than form into a battle line. Although initial assault attempts an
Map 3. Overlay of initial Spanish movements against the French at Mas Deu on 19 May 1793.[27]
As the first major battle, Mas Deu highlights two themes that persist throughout the campaign. The Army of Catalonia’s chronic shortage of artillery represents the first. Ironically, the production of high-quality cannon marked one of the few areas in which Spain kept pace with the other European powers.[28] Unfortunately for Ricardos, the civilian contracting system of haulers failed to deliver enough guns.[29] Second, despite his army’s limitations, Ricardos seized the initiative. Rather than react by stalling, he opted for action. In this instance, he pressed the attack despite superior enemy artillery. While not particularly innovative, it nonetheless proved adequate and cleared his front of the enemy’s field forces.
Lacking the manpower and cannon necessary to assault Perpignan, Ricardos moved to secure his rear by taking the forts he had bypassed during his advance. He invested Fort Bellegarde on 23 May 1793.[30] Ricardos offered surrender terms to the garrison on 24 June after weeks of ineffectual bombardment; the French surrendered the next morning. Although the Spanish light guns caused insignificant damage to the thick walls and killed only thirty Frenchmen, the garrison surrendered after running out of exhausting its supplies.[31] As a result of the capitulation, the Spanish captured more guns than they had employed for the bombardment.[32] Along with the capture of other minor French forts, Ricardos secured his rear area, thus allowing him to resume the offensive.
Before encircling or assaulting Perpignan, Ricardos first had to neutralize the entrenched French army outside the fortress. Rather than keep his garrison within the walls, Flers fortified the hills south of the city.[33] Overall, the French numbered around 12,000 infantry with limited cavalry and fifty supporting cannon.[34] On 16 July 1793, Ricardos issued battle orders, and his army advanced to assault the French.[35]
Map 4. French positions south of Perpignan on 17 July 1793.[36]
The ensuing battle revealed the inadequacy of the Spanish army. Unfortunately for Ricardos, his limited artillery again proved ineffective against the French positions.[37] His attack made initial progress, but he did not have enough soldiers to exploit the success. In particular, the Spanish lacked sufficient forces to fix the French in place. Uncommitted French units counterattacked, driving the Spanish from the field. After a relatively short engagement, Ricardos repelled a French counterattack and withdrew his forces, leaving Perpignan under French control.
Ricardos’ setback at Perpignan exemplifies the limitations of the Spanish army. Three months into the campaign, the Spanish controlled all Roussillon south of Perpignan. More importantly, the fall of Fort Bellegarde meant the French lacked the ability to interdict Spanish resupply and reinforcement. However, as the weeks passed, the Spanish army weakened from strategic consumption while the French army strengthened despite suffering more casualties. At Perpignan alone, the French lost 800 while the Spanish suffered just 139 casualties.[38] Yet, the French ranks had swelled to more than 25,000 soldiers by early August.[39] Meanwhile, only a few militia units that sporadically arrived throughout the summer reinforced the Spanish.[40] Moreover, the Siege of Toulon (29 August-19 December 1793) robbed Ricardos of further men, as regular line regiments left Roussillon to embark for the French port.[41] Although Ricardos commanded competently, he could not halt the flow of French reinforcements nor procure his own.
Lacking the artillery and manpower necessary to assault the entrenched French positions around Perpignan, Ricardos chose to blockade the city. He identified four strategic towns to secure and fortify. After a series of skirmishes, the Spanish occupied the designated positions by 8 September 1793.[42] The newly established camps enabled the Spanish to intercept any arriving French relief force.
Map 5. Spanish fortified encampments.[43]
Although Ricardos’ plan was reasonable considering his limited resources, it contained a major flaw: he released subordinate commanders from his immediate control. In the north, General Jerónimo Girón-Moctezuma, Marquess of las Amarillas, commanded the position at Peyrestortes with 6,000 men. He occupied a strong position and entrenched his men in the town and on the hills to the south.[44] On 17 September 1793, the French deployed to challenge the Spanish.[45] Around 5:00 in the afternoon, Girón-Moctezuma easily repelled the initial French thrust of 4,000 men; however, he failed to secure the ravine the north of his position, and his incompetence lost him the engagement.[46] A delayed French column of 3,500 that had arrived late to the battle utilized this approach around 7:00 p.m. to penetrate his defenses.[47]Unsurprisingly, the results proved disastrous for the Spanish. They suffered more than 1,200 killed, with an additional 500 captured compared to 200 French casualties. The French also captured forty-three cannon, bolstering their own artillery.[48]
Map 6. Battle of Peyrestortes on 17 September 1793.[49]
The Spanish invasion was on the brink of disaster following their defeat. In addition to the casualties sustained, the undersupplied Spanish were exhausted after months of campaigning while their adversaries received conscripted reinforcements thanks to the levée en masse of August 1793.[50] To consolidate his shaken army, Ricardos concentrated some 16,000 Spanish troops in and around Ponteilla. He entrenched his center and right on the hills that ranged from Ponteilla to Nils but his left remained “in the air” and thus vulnerable.
Meanwhile, Dagobert, now in command of the French army, sought to exploit Aoust’s success by assaulting the Spanish camp at Ponteilla with his army of 22,000 men with the focal point of the attack against Ricardos’ exposed left flank. The attack began on the morning of 22 September 1793. However, Ricardos’ foresight threw Dagobert’s plan into disarray. Knowing his left flank was the weakest point of his line, Ricardos had garrisoned the village of Thuir and repaired its medieval walls.[51] Thus, rather than assaulting the Spanish left, the French attack became entangled with the Spanish garrison. With his plan in shambles, Dagobert ordered his center column to engage the dispersed Spanish center; though he managed to penetrate it initially, Dagobert was soon overwhelmed after Ricardos enveloped him with cavalry and eviscerated his column, ultimately leading to Dagobert’s retreat.[52] The French suffered 3,000 casualties, with another 1,500 from the center column captured. The Spanish sustained 2,000 killed mainly from the French breakthrough.[53] However, the positive casualty exchange proved inconsequential as 15,000 reinforcements reached the French the day after the battle while Ricardos’ army continued to shrink.[54] Thus, while Ricardos appeared to have revived Spanish prospects in the south of France, no number of victories would prove sufficient without reinforcements.
Map 7. Battle of Trouillas on 22 September 1793.[55]
Despite his successes, Ricardos struggled to prevent his army from disintegrating. The flood of French reinforcements further disheartened the already weary Spanish troops.[56] Moreover, the army increasingly suffered from insufficient supplies and the consequences of malnutrition combined with exhaustion: 6,000 men fell ill in September alone.[57] The desperation of their circumstances increased desertion and indiscipline among the soldiers. In a futile attempt to restore order, Ricardos stiffened penalties: soldiers convicted of minor infractions now faced execution rather than running the gauntlet. For example, a soldier verbally discouraging fellow troops was to be “stripped of their uniform, hanged, and if no executioner is available, shot in the back as an infamous traitor to king and country.”[58] With each passing day, the army’s combat effectiveness further degraded as men fell ill, ran away, or simply refused to obey orders.
Outnumbered and outflanked to the north, west, and east, Ricardos held a council of war on 26 September 1793 to discuss the predicament of his army. After three hours of deliberation, the Spanish generals opted for an immediate withdrawal; Ricardos issued the necessary orders.[59] After discovering the news, the French pursued. Ricardos concentrated and entrenched his army at Le Boulou on 1 October 1793.[60] Located six kilometers north of Bellegarde, the redoubts would be crucial to holding the village and maintaining a foothold in Roussillon, as the city straddled the Route of Barcelona.[61] From 3-19 October, the French launched a series of successive attacks that failed to dislodge Ricardos and his army. The Spanish suffered approximately 300 casualties compared to 1,200 dead and wounded for the French.[62] Ricardos’ successful defense of Le Boulou kept his campaign alive, albeit barely.
Holding Le Boulou enabled reinforcements to reach Ricardos, which buoyed the Spanish army. On 25 November, a 5,000-strong Portuguese division under the command of General John Forbes reinforced the Spanish. [63] While the addition of the Portuguese force did not bring the army to parity with the French, it significantly increased the Spanish fighting capability. With his troop numbers partially replenished, Ricardos launched a limited offensive during the waning days of the campaign season. Rather than push north again, he turned east to Villelongue. The 10,000-strong French force stationed in the town blocked any movement east or attempt to take the port of Collioure.[64] On the evening of 6 December 1793, a Spanish force numbering 8,000 men moved northeast towards the village. Surprised, the French sustained heavy casualties —1,210 killed or wounded and 760 captured — before fleeing.[65] Meanwhile, Allied forces suffered 126 casualties. The victory briefly reinvigorated Spanish morale and offensive efforts.
In the weeks following Villelongue, the Spanish won a series of skirmishes that allowed Ricardos to push east towards Collioure and Port-Vendres. On 20 December 1793, Ricardos sent 8,000 men under General Juan de Corten to attack from the south while cavalry simultaneously distracted the French from the northwest.[66] The attack proved successful, and the Spanish easily captured the towns.[67]
The fall of Collioure and Port-Vendres spurred both armies into action. Reports of the Spanish victory reached both armies’ commanders sometime during the early morning of 21 December.[68] Now realizing the French were vulnerable, Ricardos ordered his forces to advance. He sent Forbes and his Portuguese division against the French right flank and ordered Girón-Moctezuma’s 5,000-strong division to advance against the center. Finally, he sent 500 cavalry – nearly all he had available – to cross the river further east and harass the French rear.[69] Near simultaneously, Aoust ordered a withdrawal to Perpignan, but his directive arrived too late to avoid an engagement.[70] Taken by surprise and already spread thin from the ordered retreat, the French suffered considerable casualties and fled the battlefield. Only a desperate rearguard action fought by a single demi-brigade prevented Forbes from enveloping the French from the west.[71] With his left flank now extended and exposed following the failed Portuguese flanking movement, Ricardos ordered Girón-Moctezuma to halt. The French lost approximately 2,000 out of 11,000 men to casualties and desertion yet the remainder of the army escaped.[72] With the French again confined to Perpignan, the Spanish retired to winter quarters.
Map 8. Battle of Tresserre-Banyuls on 21 December 1793.[73]
The Spanish victories in December did little to change the operational situation in Roussillon. The French levée en masse flooded the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees with fresh manpower. Including garrison forces, the army boasted more than 49,000 men by early December.[74] While their successive defeats reduced their troop numbers, fresh conscripts readily replaced casualties and deserters. In comparison, Ricardos retired to his winter quarters with only 20,000 infantry, including the Portuguese division. Moreover, Ricardos sent 4,000 horses back to Spain after an equine illness ravaged his mounts.[75] Although battle-hardened, Ricardos’ crumbling army had little prospect of being able to stop a French offensive in the next campaign season. His army retired to its winter quarters bloodied, tired, and outnumbered.
Without prospect of relief or resupply, Ricardos left the front on 18 January 1794 in a bid to preserve the results of his incursion into France.[76] He had won nearly every battle over the previous year, but the increasing flow of French reinforcements threatened his battered and bruised army. Upon his arrival at Madrid, he unsuccessfully begged for reinforcements.[77] Ricardos prepared to return to the front, but unknown to him, he had already fought his last battle. He fell ill and died of pneumonia in Madrid on 6 March 1794.[78] Just days before his death, Ricardos declared, “I predict disasters for the future campaign if the material and moral conditions of the army are not improved.”[79] Ricardos’ successors failed to replicate his success with the Army of Catalonia. Various generals took command of the army, but unlike Ricardos, none of them demonstrated the leadership or competence necessary to defeat the French repeatedly.
Despite the limitations and constraints placed upon him, Ricardos managed to achieve more than any other Spanish general during the war and won battle after battle against the French. Although Ricardos suffered from a lack of men and materiel throughout the entire campaign, he seized opportunities to achieve victories whenever possible. From seizing Saint-Laurent-de-Cerdans at the start of the campaign to reinitiating offensive operations following the Portuguese reinforcement, Ricardos repeatedly displayed disciplined initiative. No other general, Spanish nor French, won as many battles as Ricardos during the war in the Pyrenees. Ricardos stood apart from his Spanish peers and demonstrated skilled operational and tactical acumen on every examinable occasion.
CPT Michael Hamel graduated from Southern Methodist University in 2013 with a degree in History. He commissioned into the Military Police Corps and his first assignment was with the 118th Military Police Company where he served as a platoon leader. In 2015, he deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. Upon his return in February 2016, he served as the Executive Officer for HHC, 16th Military Police Brigade. After graduating from the Captains Career Course, he served on staff at the 8th Military Police Brigade and then assumed command of HHD, 19th Military Police Battalion (CID). Following command, he attended graduate school at the University of North Texas and earned an MA in History. He currently serves in the Military Division of the Department of History and is pursuing his PhD. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Army, the United States Military Academy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
Title Image: Portrait of General Antonio Ricardos by Goya, 1793.
Appendix 1: Significant Actions in the Eastern Pyrenees in 1793.
Appendix 2: Excerpt on the Death of Ricardos from Diario de las operaciones.
“In fact, the disease progressed to such extent that on 5 p.m. of March 6, he died full of Christian peace, showing those who witnessed the perseverance, resignation, and spirit with which this General, filled with triumph and honors surrendered his spirit to his Maker, leaving this irreparable loss filled with sentiment for all those who knew his moral virtue, probity [integrity], and exceedingly superior military talents.
During this last illness, the secret marriage he had contracted with his first cousin, the most honorable Ms. Francisca María Dávila Carrillo de Albornoz, Widow and Countess of Torrepalma, with permission from His Majesty, King Carlos IV, who approved it and ordered for it to become public to the progeny and family before the decease.
Their Majesties felt the death of a vassal that had contributed with so many victories to their Arms, and so the King wanted to communicate it to the whole Nation, giving public testimony of the appreciation his noble services had merited, by ordering his funeral to be made public and with all the honor and pomp indicated in the Regulations for Army Captain Generals that die in a province without their command. Notwithstanding the deceased having left instructions with his wife on several occasions and having publicly petitioned the King as a last request to dispense him of such honors, if he should so deserve them, so as to be interred without any pomp or artifice, His Majesty did not see fit to cede on this point under any circumstance, but wanted to provide public proof of the high esteem that his distinguished service had deserved. By virtue of this, he was buried in public with all honors on March 8, at the Parish church of San Luis, among the abundant presence of the public that came to see him.
Thus ended his days, covered in glory, at 66 years, 6 months, and 2 days of age, the Most Honorable Don Antonio Ricardos Carrillo Albornoz, Captain General of the Royal Armies and the Principality of Catalonia, General in Chief of the Rosellón Army, Commander of the Casas de Córdoba in the Order of Santiago, Administrator in the Obrería, in the [Order] of the Calatrava, and Grand Cross Knight of the Distinguished Order of Charles III, after 51 years of service, having started [his military career] as Captain of the Cavalry Regiment of Malta, in a class was in the Army of Italy and participated in the battles of Parma and Tidone, as well as in other military actions of that campaign. He was also in the Portuguese Army, and then moved to the Indias [American Colonies] to organize the Army, Militias, fortresses, and presidios of New Spain. On his return, he was entrusted with delineating the borders with France, was awarded General Inspector of Cavalry, participated in the Algiers Expedition, and was appointed Captain General of Gipuzkoa.”
Endnotes:
[1] Santos Sánchez, Colección de todas la pragmáticas, cédulas, provisiones, circulares, autos acordados, vandos, y otras providencias publicadas en el actual reynado del Señor Don Carlos IV (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda é Hijo de Marin, 1794), 1:346-48.
[2] Refer to Appendix 1 for major combat actions in the campaign.
[3] Ramsay Weston Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2018), 3:151-155.
[4] Paddy Griffith, The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789-1802 (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 49.
[5] Manuel de Godoy, Memoirs of Don Manuel de Godoy: Prince of the Peace (London: Richard Bentley, 1836), 1:127-128; Jean-François Bourgoing, Modern State of Spain: Exhibiting a complete View of its Topography, Government, Laws, Religion, Finances, Naval and Military Establishments, and of Society, Manners, Arts, Sciences, Agriculture, and Commerce in that Country (London: John Stockdale, 1808), 3:321. The minister of war transferred several units to the Army of Catalonia beginning in December 1792. However, these units were not at full strength. Moreover, many of these units were organically part of the Army of Catalonia but were on detached duty before being recalled. For detailed unit movement orders see Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza (hereafter cited as AHN), call numbers LACY, C.1, D.13, D.56, D.99, D.123, D.165-169, and D.433.
[6] Estado Militar de España Año de 1793 (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1793); Pedraza to Ricardos, 1 April 1793, Archivo Historico Militar de Madrid (hereafter cited as AHMM), 7236.8; “Día 15 (abril)” to “Día 31 (octubre),” Diario de las operaciones del ejército español que entró en Francia por el Rosellón, Biblioteca Nacional de España, MSS/1276, 1001158748; Bourgoing, Modern State, 3:321; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas en los Pirineos a finales del siglo XVIII: 1793–1795. (Madrid: Servicio Histórico Militar, 1949–1959), 2:127-133. It is likely that the Army of Catalonia numbered fewer than 25,000 at the time France declared war and that Spain surged units to the border in the ensuing months after it realized war could not be avoided. Expelled from the Spanish court in February 1793, French ambassador Jean-Francois de Bourgoing passed through Catalonia on his travels back to France. Writing of the Army of Catalonia’s garrison, he stated, “garrisoned only by seventeen hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry, and there were no more than five thousand infantry in its environs. Such was the force which, in March 1793, Spain had to employ in the imaginary invasion of Roussillon.”
[7] Indart to García, 23 November 1792; AHN, LACY, C.1, D.124-27.
[8] “Día 15 (abril)” to “Día 22 (abril),” Diario de las operaciones.
[9] For contemporary commentary regarding Spain’s lack of preparations in Catalonia, see Bourgoing, Modern State, 3:318-338.
[10] Napoléon Fervel, Campagnes de le Révolution française dans les Pyrénées orientales, 1793-95 (Paris: Pillet fils aîné, 1851), 1: 255-256.
[11] Ramsay Weston Phipps, Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2018), 3:138.
[12] Dépôt de la Guerre, Carte D’état-Major, map.
[13] See Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:147 for a detailed description of the fort.
[14] E. Collin, Frontiere de France & d’Espagne, map.
[15] Fervel, Campagnes, 1:35.
[16] David R. Ringrose, Transportation and Economic Stagnation in Spain, 1750-1850 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), 44-47, 83; Tomás J. González Carvajal, Del oficio y cargos del intendente de exército en campana (Valencia: n.p., 1810), 79-88.
[17] “Día 16 (abril),” Diario de las operaciones.
[18] Teatro de las operaciones llevadas a cabo con motive de la Conquista de Bellegarde por los españoles (1793), AHMM, 7239.20; Dépôt de la Guerre, Carte D’état-Major: “Perpignan,” map.
[19] “Día 17 (abril),” Diario de las operaciones; David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Scribner, 1966), 358-59.
[20] “Día 23 (abril),” Diario de las operaciones; Fervel, Campagnes, 1:40; See Map 2 for pass location.
[21] “Día 26 (abril),” Diario de las operaciones.
[22] “Día 26 (abril),” Diario de las operaciones.
[23] Phipps, Armies, 152; Fervel, Campagnes,1:47; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:230.
[24] “Día 11 (mayo)” to “Días 19 y 20 (mayo),” Diario de las operaciones.
[25] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:231-232.
[26] “20 (mai),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales journal depuis le Avril 1793 jusques au 22 Juillet, AHMM, 7241.1; “Días 19 y 20 (mayo),” Diario de las operaciones.
[27] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:226, 841; “Días 19 y 20 (mayo),” Diario de las operaciones; Dépôt de la Guerre, Carte D’état-Major: “Céret,” map.
[28] Jorge Vigón, Historia de la artillería Española (Madrid: Instituto Jeronimo Zurita, 1947), 2:303-304.
[29] Charles Esdaile, “The Spanish Army in the Revolutionary Era 1788-1814,” (PhD thesis, University of Lancaster, 1985), 89-90.
[30] “Día 23 (mayo),” Diario de las operaciones.
[31] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:280-281.
[32] Juan Antuñano, Vista de Bellagarda (Barcelona: En la oficina de Carlos Gibert Tutó, 1793); “Día 26 (junio),” Diario de las operaciones.
[33] Fervel, Campagnes, 1:67-69; Phipps, Armies, 152.
[34] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:842; Fervel, Campagnes, 1:256.
[35] “Orden dada el 16 de julio,” Diario de las operaciones.
[36] Dépôt de la Guerre, Carte D’état-Major: “Perpignan,” map; Fervel, Campagnes, 1:67; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:842.
[37] Heredia to Lorenzana, 23 July 1793, in Campañas 2:823; “20 (juillet),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales.
[38] “Bajas ocurridas en la accion del 17 de julio,” Diario de las operaciones. Both the Spanish army’s operational journal and Fervel report that the French lost an additional 600 men to desertion after the battle.
[39] Fervel, Campagnes, 1:257.
[40] Relación de las tropas que existe en el Principado [de Cataluña] indicando sus comandantes, destinos y fuerza que poseen, 1 June 1793, AHN, LACY,C.1,D.379; Baños to Negrete, 23 July 1793, AHN, LACY, C.1, D.322.
[41] “Día 31 (agosto),” Diario de las operaciones; Relación de las tropas, 1 June 1793, AHN, LACY,C.1,D.379.
[42] “Día 31 (agosto)” to “Día 8 (septiembre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[43] Phipps, Armies, 154; E. Collin, Frontiere de France & d’Espagne, map.
[44] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:444-46.
[45] Phipps, Armies, 152; The most recent commander had resigned and fled. The two previous commanders had been charged with treason and imprisoned. In total, seven different generals commanded the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees, sometimes for only weeks. For list of commanders with their command timelines see Charles Clerget, Tableaux des armées françaises pendant les guerres de La Révolution (Paris: R. Chapelot, 1905), 23.
[46] Labeled as Ravin dels Avents on Map 6.
[47] Antoine Noguès, Mémoires du Général Noguès (1777-1853): Sur Les Guerres De L’empire, ed. André de Maricourt (Paris: Lemerre, 1922), 69-73; “16&17 (septembre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:446-450; Fervel, Campagnes, 1:137-47.
[48] Digby Smith, The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book: Actions and Losses in Personnel, Colours, Standards and Artillery, 1792-1815(London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 57.
[49] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:445; Dépôt de la Guerre, “Céret,” 1851, map; Fervel, Campagnes, 1:137-147.
[50] Charles J. Esdaile, “The Spanish Army,” in European Armies of the French Revolution: 1789-1802, ed. Frederick C. Schneid (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 176.
[51] “22 (septembre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:483.
[52] Phipps, Armies, 158-59, “Día 22 (septiembre),” Diario de las operaciones; Esdaile, “Spanish Army,” 177-78.
[53] Smith, Napoleonic Wars, 57.
[54] Godoy, Memoirs, 1:249; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:496.
[55] Dépôt de la Guerre, Carte D’état-Major: “Céret,” map; Esdaile, “Spanish Army,” 176-77; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:479-493, 845; “Día 22 (septiembre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[56] Heredia to Lorenzana, 28 September 1793, in Campañas 2:829-30; Godoy, Memoirs, 1:249.
[57] “Día 26 (septiembre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[58] Antonio Ricardos, Órdenes del Ejército del Rosellón, AHMM, 6176.50; Ordenanzas de Su Majestad para el régimen, disciplina, subordinación y servicio de sus ejércitos (Madrid: Pedro Marin Impresor de la Secretaría del Despacho, 1768), 8:10, 1-121.
[59] “Día 26 (septiembre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[60] “Día 1 (octubre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[61] See Map 1.
[62] “Día 3 (octubre)” to “Día 19” (octubre),” Diario de las operaciones; “3 (octobre” to “16-17 & 19 (octobre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales; Heredia to Lorenzana, 5 October 1793, in Campañas 2:830-32.
[63] Claudio de Chaby, excerptos historicos e colecção de documentos relativos á guerra denominada da peninsula e ás anteriores de 1801, e do Roussillon e Cataluña (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1863), 50-53.
[64] Smith, Napoleonic Wars, 63.
[65] Día 6 (diciembre)” to “Día 7 (diciembre),” Diario de las operaciones; Fervel, Campagnes, 1:222.
[66] “Día 20 (diciembre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[67] “21 & 22 (décembre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales; “Día 20 (diciembre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[68] “Día 21 (diciembre),” Diario de las operaciones; “21 – du 28 au 29 (décembre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales.
[69] “Día 21 (diciembre),” Diario de las operaciones.
[70] “21 – du 28 au 29 (décembre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales.
[71]Fervel, Campagnes, 246-48.
[72] “Día 21 (diciembre),” Diario de las operaciones; 22 (décembre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales; Fervel, Campagnes, 248: Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:720-27.
[73] “Día 21 (diciembre),” Diario de las operaciones; “21 – du 28 au 29 (décembre),” Armée des Pyrénées orientales; Fervel, Campagnes, 1:248; Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:720-27; Dépôt de la Guerre, Carte D’état-Major: “Céret,” map.
[74] Fervel, Campagnes, 1:259.
[75] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 3:361.
[76] “Día 1 de enero de 1794,” Diario de las operaciones.
[77] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:83-84.
[78] “Día 28 febrero hasta 6 de marzo,” Diario de las operaciones. Confusion exists regarding Ricardos’ death in secondary sources and is generally given as 13 March 1794. However, the operational diary of Ricardos’ army states: “the disease progressed to such extent that [he died] on 5:00 pm of March 6” and “he was buried in public with all honors on March 8 in the Parish Church of Saint Louis.” See appendix 2 for a more complete excerpt.
[79] Estado Mayor Central, Campañas, 2:84.
Age of Revolutions 
