By Pedro David Correa Pérez

In 1930, Senator Joseph Ransdell introduced a resolution to the United States Congress calling for an investigation into the violations that the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez in Venezuela (1908–1935) committed against U.S. citizens. Gómez had ruled the country for more than two decades, a period during which the oil industry began to emerge. His administration brought stability to public finances, strengthened the armed forces, and implemented an ambitious road construction project to connect the nation with the twofold purpose of modernizing the country and centralizing his power. To maintain power, Gómez persecuted, exiled, and ordered the killing of political opponents who challenged his authority.

Juan Vicente Gomez (1928), Wikipedia

Ransdell’s initiative divided reactions among members of the Venezuelan opposition in exile. Some viewed the senator’s effort as an opportunity to undermine one of the regime’s sources of strength: United States support. Others, however, despite their hatred toward Gómez, regarded the resolution as an intolerable act of foreign interference in Venezuelan affairs.

Venezuelan exiles in New York cooperated with Ransdell by providing and collecting testimonies that highlighted the unconstitutional character of Gómez’s regimen­—both in its origins and in its methods of governance—as well as the absence of the rule of law, the manipulation of legislation, and the lack of a genuine separation of powers. They also denounced abuses committed by Gómez and his repressive apparatus, including arbitrary arrests and other violations of civil liberties. Several exiles who had endured imprisonment under the regime provided firsthand testimony and documented the names of those who died in prison. In doing so, they often referred to what they had known personally, including friends and family members.

Some were careful to clarify that their testimony sought only to inform American public opinion and, at most, to secure the moral condemnation of the Venezuelan regime and a rupture in diplomatic relations as Mexico had done in 1923. They endorsed “the governments of civilized nations withdrawing their moral support from an autocracy that without that support would inevitably and spectacularly collapse.”[1]

Senator Joseph Eugene Ransdell (1950), Wikipedia

Most of those who collaborated with Ransdell were Venezuelan exiles residing in New York City, where an opposition community had taken shape from the early years of the dictatorship. Many identified themselves as liberals in a classical sense and remained, to a considerable extent, rooted in 19^th century political traditions. Their liberalism emphasized the defense of the rule of law, individual liberties, limited state intervention in the economy, and the preservation of national sovereignty.

The community’s strong anti-Gómez activism took many forms. Exiles published pamphlets, books, and newspapers, organized public events, and openly conspired to overthrow the dictator. The community living in New York prepared an invasion in 1924. Led by General Leopoldo Baptista, the invasion ended in complete failure. The Angelita’s remarkably poor condition forced the ship to make repeated stops along its route. The vessel could not even reach Mexico to collect the weapons that supporters had promised in Mexico. Despite this setback, the exile community in New York continued to conspire until the end of the dictatorship.

In 1930, parallel to Ransdell’s proposal in the U.S. Congress, a controversy emerged among Venezuelans themselves over whether the initiative constituted an unacceptable form of foreign interference in the country’s affairs. Most of those who participated in the debate were also exiles and liberals. However, unlike those who collaborated with the congressional inquiry, they were more suspicious of what such investigations might entail. One of them, the journalist Carlos López Bustamante, stated it clearly in his response to Congress: “No true Venezuelan will accept that any foreign power ignores the laws of our country.”[2] In other words, Gómez was accountable to the Venezuelan people, not to a foreign government. The broader context of the era shaped these concerns. At the time, U.S. interventionism in Latin America was at its height. American troops occupied Haiti and Nicaragua, while Washington exercised significant influence in Cuba, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.[3]

At heart, the exiles were debating: what were the limits in the fight against the dictatorship? Faced with a possible U.S. intervention, Jorge Luciani, one of the most vehement opponents of the investigation, summed it up like this: “You can’t cure a disease with another disease.”[4] Santos Dominici, who had diplomatic experience, warned that “once the U.S. government has broken with Gómez, that government would not stop there, they would not simply stand by and do nothing.”[5] Other participants argued that Gómez’s opponents had to consider the consequences of their actions because any mistake or misunderstanding could mean that “we will appear, as we have appeared to date before friends and strangers alike, as reckless or adventurous.”[6] Ultimately, these quotes demonstrate that the exiles opposed Congress’ investigation due to the possible consequences of foreign intervention.

The controversy had its effect: all those who collaborated with the Committee either backtracked or at least clarified that they did not want an intervention. Pedro Jugo Delgado, one of the initiative’s main promoters, published the book El peligro de la intervención en Venezuela (The Threat of Intervention in Venezuela) to present his version of events. Ransdell’s proposal did not get far; the Hoover administration had no interest in severing diplomatic relations or affecting its business dealings with Gómez. This initiative only served to further divide the opposition.

Almost a century after these debate, U.S. special forces entered Venezuelan territory and captured the head of state, Nicolás Maduro. The threat of external intervention, which exiles had previously feared in 1930, finally became a reality. This time, however, large sectors of the opposition welcomed the military operation (or simply remained silent) with María Corina Machado (MCM) at the forefront of those who supported it. MCM, elected leader of a formidable grassroot opposition movement, stands out. She also identifies herself as a liberal. In fact, on several occasions, she has invoked the memory of her great-uncle, Armando Zuloaga Blanco, a young man killed in a failed invasion against Gómez in 1929, as a guide in her struggle. However, her position differs from that of the exiles of the early 20th century in her explicit advocacy of foreign intervention, which, she argued, was the only way to recover democracy.

Nicolás Maduro (2013), Britannica

Much has changed since the debates of 1930. Liberal discourse has evolved, and national sovereignty no longer occupies the central place it once held within many liberal traditions.[7] From a Venezuelan perspective, the profound economic crisis that began in 2013 and reached its most severe phase around 2020, together with the humanitarian emergency and the mass displacement of more than eight million Venezuelans, created a context in which concerns about survival often overshadowed ideals of national pride and territorial sovereignty. All of this, coupled with the Maduro’s regime’s systematic violation of human rights, documented by the United Nations, and the disrespect for popular sovereignty expressed on July 28, 2024, by those in power—who refused any possibility of reaching an understanding with the opposition—opened the door for Maduro’s removal.[8]

The Venezuelan crisis has unfolded in the context of a second Trump administration whose foreign policy has taken a more interventionist turn, drawing comparisons to earlier traditions of U.S. power projection in the hemisphere, such as Big Stick diplomacy. U. S. military action against Iran, expressions of interest in acquiring Greenland, and repeated clashes with European leaders reflect this policy. In Latin America, this approach has involved support for right-wing political leaders in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Honduras, tensions with the Colombian government, and renewed threats toward Cuba. The most significant outcome of this policy has been the emergence of an interim government headed by Delcy Rodríguez, which operates under the political tutelage of the Trump administration.

The events of January 2026 have not produced the outcome anticipated by the opposition. According to President Donald Trump’s own statement, he and Rodríguez appear to have developed a productive working relationship. So far, discussion there has been much more talk about the oil industry and economic recovery than about the return to democracy. The Venezuelan government has abandoned the anti-imperialist rhetoric it had maintained since Hugo Chávez to partner with the U.S. for the extraction of its oil. Despite MCM’s efforts to cultivate ties with the Trump administration, the U.S. president appears to prefer dealing with the interim government; not even MCM had been able to return to her country. At present, Trump appears to be the only clear winner of this arrangement; he has insisted that billions of oil barrels are going from Venezuela to the U.S., and, at a recent event, he bragged, “To the victor belongs the spoils.”[9]

Recently, the Rodríguez government and sectors of the opposition launched a new round of negotiations, which the United States has overseen. While observers express anticipation, the continued incarceration of political prisoners, the lack of a clear electoral timetable, and the systematic exclusion of MCM—whom millions still revere as the country’s most popular leader—fuel deep skepticism regarding whether these talks will ultimately fulfill the Venezuelan people’s aspirations for popular sovereignty or just Washington’s interests. At some point, we Venezuelans need to discuss the implications of external intervention to resolve domestic political disputes and the risks that such intervention may pose to national interests. Venezuelan exiles at the beginning of the twentieth century understood this threat all too well.

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Pedro David Correa Pérez is a doctoral candidate at El Colegio de México. His publications include the book La Patria Pícara. Estudio sobre la prensa jocoseria venezolana en el siglo XIX (2013), as well as numerous articles and book chapters, the most recent being “Compatriotas, no compañeros: conflictos entre exiliados venezolanos en México (1929-1930),” included in the work Exilios, destierros y Asilos en Iberoamérica contemporánea (2024), compiled by José Francisco Mejía Flores.

Title Image: Nicolás Maduro. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Further Readings:

Aveledo, Guillermo. “‘Ustedes, liberales de principios…’: La lucha por la existencia del liberalismo histórico venezolano a partir de 1936.” Politeia 28, no. 34–35 (2005): 54-79. Redalyc, https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=1700180630 05

Gómez Álvarez, Anahías. “Estudio Histórico sobre los intentos del gobierno de Los Estados Unidos de América por derrocar a Juan Vicente Gómez (1910–1922).” PhD diss., Universidad Central de Venezuela. 2021.

McBeth, Brian. Dictatorship and Politics. Intrigue, Betrayal and Survival (1908–1935). University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

Piñero, Jesús. José Rafael Pocaterra, periodista en Nueva York: la oposición a Gómez desde el exilio (1922–1923). Caracas: ANH-Fundación Bancaribe para la Ciencia y la Cultura, 2021.

Straka, Tomás. “Seeing from the Showroom.” ReVista, February 26, 2026, https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/seeing-from-the-showroom/.

Endnotes:

[1] Letter from Ruiz Urrutia to A. L. King, in El peligro de la intervención, ed. Pedro Jugo (New York: M.P. Basso & Company, 1930), 24.

[2] Letter from López Bustamante to A. L. King, in El peligro de la intervención, 32.

[3] See Laurent Dubois and Richard Lee Turits, Freedom Roots: Histories from the Caribbean (University of North Carolina Press, 2022).

[4] Jorge Luciani, La dictadura perpetua (Caracas: Cooperativa de artes gráficas,1936), 158.

[5] Letter from Dominici and Padilla to Jugo Delgado, in El peligro de la intervención, 42.

[6] Letter from Flores Cabreras and Padilla to Jugo Delgado, in El peligro de la intervención, 45.

[7] See David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (Routledge, 2010); and Jens Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form (Routledge, 2014).

[8] Ysrrael Camero, “Venezuela 2026: tutelaje, autoritarismo, o democratización,” Devenires y Pensares, February 13, 2026, https://devenirespensares.wordpress.com/2026/02/13/venezuela-2026-tutelaje-autoritarismo-o-democratizacion/

[9] Et Online, “‘Don’t Want to Kill People,’ Trump Says Iran Asked Him to Halt the ‘Biggest Attack’ Since WWII,” The Economic Times, August 6, 2026, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/i-do-not-want-to-kill-people-trump-says-us-would-prefer-deal-but-warns-tehran-against-nuclear-ambitions/articleshow/132979176.cms?from=mdr.