By Farzeen Nasri
The U.S. president’s public encouragement of peaceful Iranian demonstrators to act more defiantly in January 2026,[1] paired with explicit and unambiguous promises that American support was imminent,[2] has had catastrophic consequences. That encouragement, followed by abrupt inaction, has already cost thousands of lives, with executions and reprisals continuing amid one of the deadliest crackdowns in the history of the Islamic Republic.[3] Beyond the immediate human toll, the episode has inflicted lasting strategic damage. It weakened popular resolve at a critical moment in Iranians’ struggle against a deeply unpopular and repressive regime, while severely undermining U.S. credibility among the people. Today, many Iranians feel profoundly betrayed by the American government—and that sense of betrayal is likely to shape U.S.–Iran relations long after the Islamic Republic itself is gone.[4]
The damage extended well beyond bilateral relations. Explanations offered for Donald Trump’s abrupt reversal—particularly claims that objections from Persian Gulf states and Israel compelled Washington to stand down—carried serious regional implications, especially for future Iran–Israel relations.[5] This was all the more significant given that public and private signals from Iran’s Arab neighbors at the time did not align.[6]
After repeated expressions of solidarity with the Iranian people, many Iranians perceived Israel’s failure to provide tangible support during the January crackdown—combined with reports that it urged U.S. restraint—as an unforgivable betrayal.[7] That perception made it extraordinarily difficult for any future Israeli government to earn the trust of the Iranian public. Even more troubling, these events reinforced the regime’s preferred narrative: the United States and Israel encouraged Iranians to rise up not to liberate them from religious dictatorship, but merely to weaken the regime—regardless of the human cost.[8] For a government like Iran’s, sustained by propaganda and fear, this represented an extraordinary and wholly undeserved strategic gift.
The subsequent regional war suggests that the January inaction may have reflected less a lack of operational preparedness than an absence of clear strategy. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched major joint strikes against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and targeting military, nuclear, and leadership infrastructure across Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj, and Kerman.[9] The operation triggered Iranian retaliatory strikes against Israel, U.S. military bases, and Gulf states, setting off a regional war whose scale and trajectory suggest that the strikes were executed without a fully developed strategic framework for managing their consequences.[10] A fundamental question nonetheless remains: why issue forceful, time-sensitive promises to Iranian demonstrators in January without either the capacity—or the intent—to fulfill them at that moment, at the cost of thousands of civilian lives?
The February strikes may have done little to repair—and may have deepened—the Iranian people’s loss of trust in Washington and Jerusalem. For those who survived the January crackdown, lost family members, or were imprisoned during the weeks of inaction, the military operation is unlikely to read as solidarity. It arrives too late, at too high a cost, and without a credible framework for the day after. It may instead confirm the regime’s long-standing narrative: external powers act in their own strategic interests, not in the interests of the Iranian people.[11]
A more precise account of the January failure may be that the United States and Israel were prepared to offer a degree of support to demonstrators but were not prepared—strategically or politically—to pursue the larger objective of fundamentally weakening or dismantling the Islamic Republic. The February strikes suggest operational capability existed; what was absent was a coherent strategy for translating that capability into a sustainable outcome. The result has been the worst of both worlds: insufficient support to sustain the January uprising, followed by military action without a clear post-strike political framework—at the cost of thousands of additional Iranian casualties and massive structural damage to Iranian cities and infrastructure that will burden the Iranian people, not the regime’s surviving leadership, for years to come.[12]
Iran today exhibits many of the structural conditions associated with revolutionary situations: a deeply unpopular regime, economic crisis, social fragmentation, and a population increasingly willing to confront authority.[13] Scholars of revolution emphasize how such moments are highly contingent, shaped by elite cohesion, security force loyalty, and the expectations created by both internal and external actors.
U.S. leadership’s public encouragement of Iranian demonstrators in January, alongside explicit signals that support was imminent, created expectations that were not fulfilled at the time. Historical cases suggest that ambiguous or reversed external signaling can undermine popular resolve, empower entrenched regimes, and shape revolutionary memory in enduring ways. Comparable dynamics were observed during the 1848 European revolutions, in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and in the Arab Spring, where international encouragement did not consistently translate into material or strategic support.[14] The subsequent February strikes suggest that the January reversal may have reflected a lack of strategic clarity rather than outright abandonment—though one whose human costs were borne entirely by Iranian civilians.
Mitigating the damage may still be possible. Had a coherent strategy of external support been pursued from the outset, one combining reliable communication infrastructure, credible signaling, and coordinated pressure, the conditions that made military intervention appear necessary might never have fully materialized. The steps outlined below, taken earlier and in concert, may have offered a path toward change that did not require war. Chief among them is maintaining or restoring reliable channels for protest coordination: uncensored internet access has historically preserved both mobilization and morale in comparable uprisings. Iran’s near-total internet blackout beginning January 8 concealed the scale of the crackdown from the outside world for days, and the pattern repeated itself after the start of the current war — underscoring that information suppression remains a central and deliberate tool of repression.[15]
Deep institutional rivalries persist between Iran’s regular military, and the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij, and affiliated units, and historical research indicates that fractures between conventional forces and paramilitary or elite security units significantly increase the likelihood of regime collapse under popular pressure.[16] A rupture between the conventional military and the Guards is more plausible—and ultimately more consequential—than an internal collapse within the Guards themselves. Reporting by Iran International in March 2026, citing informed sources inside Iran’s armed forces, indicates that supply shortages and logistical breakdowns—including disputes over medical evacuation, ammunition distribution, and access to basic supplies—have intensified these tensions, further compounded by competition over decreasing resources since the start of the war.[17] At the same time, the European Union’s designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, and the supreme leader’s refusal to pursue a credible diplomatic off-ramp prior to the February strikes, had already intensified internal strains within the IRGC.[18] The death of Khamenei and the rapid elevation of his son Mojtaba as supreme leader on March 8 has further complicated the question of institutional loyalty and legitimacy.[19] These fractures should be exploited, not ignored.
Foreign militias deployed during the January crackdowns—primarily from Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—underscored both a shortage of loyal domestic forces and the regime’s fear of defection. U.S. and Israeli strikes beginning February 28 have directly targeted Iranian-backed militia infrastructure in Iraq and Syria, degrading their capacity for future repression.[20] Sanctioning and constraining these units mirrors strategies used in other revolutionary contexts, including Cold War-era Eastern Europe and post-colonial African uprisings, to reduce state capacity for repression.[21]
Efforts to disrupt key financial lifelines, particularly oil exports, reduce the regime’s ability to fund coercion and maintain proxy networks—a dynamic consistent with historical cases where economic isolation accelerated revolutionary outcomes.[22] The U.S., EU, and allied designations of the IRGC as a terrorist organization have created an additional and underutilized instrument of pressure: they provide the legal basis for seizing and reallocating regime-linked financial assets held within Western jurisdictions, resources that could be directed toward supporting the opposition during any transitional period.[23] Iranian attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for the February strikes have further destabilized global energy markets, compounding Iran’s economic isolation and narrowing the regime’s remaining financial options.[24]
“What’s really going on in the Strait of Hormuz? CNN
Reports indicate that American intermediaries provided the president with false assurances that detained demonstrators would not be executed.[25] Such misinformation—supplied by a government’s own channels rather than by an adversary—is particularly consequential: it produces decisions detached from ground realities, drives inaction at critical junctures, and ultimately destroys the credibility of that government among those who paid the price of its misjudgment, with lasting effects on revolutionary mobilization and post-regime political trajectories.[26] The 1979 precedent in Iran is instructive: in World Politics, the author argued that “conflicting signals coming from Washington” contributed to the Shah’s confusion, eroded cohesion among his inner circle, and accelerated his downfall—demonstrating that misinformation flowing through a government’s own intermediaries can be as strategically fatal as any failure of external intelligence.[27] This dynamic lends particular urgency to the current moment: for the Iranian people, the greatest nightmare is not the war itself, but the prospect of it ending with the regime still standing—and turning its full capacity for retribution against those who dared to oppose it.
As argued in “Is a Revolution in Iran on the Horizon?” Iran had already met the core conditions of a revolutionary situation.[28] Those conditions are now more acute. Turning this moment into a successful revolution requires leadership, ideological clarity, organizational capacity, and defections within security forces.[29]
Reza Pahlavi has emerged as a figure most invoked by demonstrators inside and outside Iran as a potential transitional leader, positioning himself as a facilitator of democratic transition who would leave the shape of post-regime governance to a national referendum.[30] The question of transitional leadership nonetheless remains contested: domestically, many credible figures are imprisoned or unwilling to declare themselves publicly, yet the absence of a recognized alternative is itself a form of regime preservation—prolonging uncertainty, deterring foreign support, and rendering the day after more precarious. Quiet, non-dependent backing of whatever transitional leadership emerges could facilitate coordination without creating dependency or undermining indigenous authority, paralleling cases in modern European revolutions where external encouragement of credible local leaders strengthened revolutionary cohesion.[31] Delay carries compounding costs: deferring consolidation around a transitional figure means deferring both urgent work of arresting Iran’s economic collapse and the construction of a credible off-ramp—one through which members of the security apparatus seeking to abandon the regime can do so safely, and without which reconstruction, political or material, cannot meaningfully begin. A transitional leader also will help shape the ideology and organization needed in any successful revolutionary movement.
Revolutions are periods of extraordinary opportunity and extraordinary risk. Mixed signals, unfulfilled promises, and abrupt reversals shape not only immediate outcomes but also collective memory and strategic calculations for decades to come.[32]
For the Iranian people, the consequences of January’s abandonment have already proven enduring, measured in thousands of lives lost before any external intervention materialized. The February 28 strikes represent a belated and now far more costly form of engagement — one that has triggered a regional war, devastated critical infrastructure, and inflicted thousands of additional civilian casualties, leaving Iran’s political future profoundly uncertain.[33] For the United States and its allies—particularly Israel—the strategic costs of the January reversal may yet be partially offset by subsequent events, but the moral debt incurred by encouraging demonstrators and then standing aside as they were massacred will not be easily forgiven. By situating Iran within the comparative study of revolutions, scholars and policymakers can better understand how external signaling, security force cohesion, and leadership dynamics interact to determine revolutionary trajectories—and how the absence of a clear strategic framework can be as consequential as the intervention itself.
Farzeen Nasri is Professor and Research Scholar in International Political Economy at the Graduate School of Global and International Studies, University of Salamanca, Spain; Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Economics at Ventura College; and Senior Expert at GeoRisk Solutions. Nasri holds a Master’s in International Economics from Tehran University, a Master’s in International Relations, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from New York University and The New School. He is the author of “Iranian Studies and the Iranian Revolution,” World Politics.
Further Readings:
Mark R. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 259–276.
Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Endnotes:
[1] Donald Trump, Truth Social, January 13, 2026: “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING — TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!!” as reported in Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., “Trump Tells Iranian Protesters ‘Help Is on Its Way,’” NBC News, January 13, 202, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-trump-tariffs-crackdown-protests-regime-rcna253731.
[2] Donald Trump, Truth Social, January 2, 2026: “The United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go”; January 13, 2026: “HELP IS ON ITS WAY,” as reported in Time, “Iranian Protesters Say They Were Betrayed by Trump,” January 17, 2026, https://time.com/7347090/iran-protesters-trump-help/; “Iran Protests: Trump Suggests Americans Should Leave,” ABC News, January 14, 2026, https://abcnews.go.com/International/iran-protests-646-killed-activists-trump-weighs-military/story?id=129156635.
[3] “How Iran Crushed a Citizen Uprising with Lethal Force,” The New York Times, January 26, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/25/world/middleeast/iran-how-crackdown-was-done.html.
[4] “Some Iranians Feel Betrayed by Trump for Not Helping Protesters as Vowed,” The Washington Post, January 19, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/19/iran-trump-attack-protesters-killed/. For a theoretical discussion, see Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
[5] Virginia Pietromarchi, “Gulf Countries Gear Up Diplomacy to Stave off US-Iran Escalation,” Al Jazeera, January 16, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/16/gulf-countries-gear-up-diplomacy-to-stave-off-us-iran-escalation; Reuters, reporting on U.S., Gulf, and Israeli consultations during Iran crisis, January–February 2026.
[6] “Push from Saudis, Israel Helped Move Trump to Attack Iran,” The Washington Post, February 28, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/02/28/trump-iran-decision-saudi-arabia-israel/. Saudi Arabia publicly denied lobbying for strikes—see “Saudi Arabia Did Not Lobby US to Strike Iran,” Al Arabiya, March 2, 2026, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/03/02/saudi-arabia-did-not-lobby-us-to-strike-iran-denies-washington-post-claim—itself illustrating the divergence between Riyadh’s public and private positions; Elliott Abrams et al., “What Iran’s Protests Mean for Countries in the Middle East,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 13, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-irans-protests-mean-countries-middle-east
[7] “While Publicly Urging Iranians to Take to Streets, Israeli Officials Said to Privately Admit Protesters Will Be ‘Slaughtered,’” Times of Israel, liveblog entry, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/while-publicly-urging-iranians-to-take-to-streets-israeli-officials-said-to-privately-admit-protesters-will-be-slaughtered/; “Israel Urges Restraint as Iran Protests Escalated,” The Guardian, January 10, 2026.
[8] Kay Armin Serjoie, “Iranians Say Trump’s Intervention Brought Destruction, Not Liberation,” Time, March 10, 2026, https://time.com/article/2026/03/10/iran-war-trump-us-israel-regime/; Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Regime Narrative and Propaganda,” January 2026.
[9] “Iran’s Supreme Leader Killed in U.S.-Israeli Attack,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/01/iran-succession-supreme-leader-khamenei/; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Iran Strike Assessment: February–March 2026,” Strategic Comments, March 2026;; “Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Killed in US-Israel Strikes,” Bloomberg, February 28, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-28/ali-khamenei-iran-s-supreme-leader-killed-in-us-israel-strikes.
[10] “Israel Expands Invasion of Southern Lebanon – as It Happened,” The Guardian, March 29, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/mar/29/middle-east-crisis-live-explosions-tehran-yemen-houthis-iran-war-updates-trump-us-israel-strikes-lebanon; House of Commons Library, “US-Israel Strikes on Iran: February/March 2026,” Research Briefing, March 2026; IISS, “Iran Strike Assessment,” Strategic Comments, March 2026.
[11]“Some Iranians Feel Betrayed by Trump for Not Helping Protesters as Vowed,” The Washington Post, January 19, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/19/iran-trump-attack-protesters-killed/; Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Regime Narrative and Propaganda,” January 2026.
[12] Kay Armin Serjoie, “Iranians Say Trump’s Intervention Brought Destruction, Not Liberation,” Time, March 10, 2026, https://time.com/article/2026/03/10/iran-war-trump-us-israel-regime/; Amnesty International, “Iran: Civilian Impact of Military Strikes,” March 2026; House of Commons Library, “US-Israel Strikes on Iran,” Research Briefing, March 2026.
[13] Farzeen Nasri, “Is a Revolution in Iran on the Horizon,” Age of Revolutions, January 1, 2025, https://ageofrevolutions.com/2025/01/01/is-a-revolution-in-iran-on-the-horizon/; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 47–52.
[14] Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) Introduction & Chs. 1–2; Mark R. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 259–276.
[15] Access Now, “#KeepItOn: Iran Plunged into Digital Darkness, Concealing Human Rights Abuses,” January 9, 2026, https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-iran-digital-darkness-human-rights-abuses/; Amnesty International, “Iran: Internet Shutdown Conceals Escalating Repression,” January 8, 2026; Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2025: Iran,” 2025.
[16] Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 180–205; Ali Alfoneh, “Eternal Rivals? The Artesh and the IRGC,” Middle East Institute, November 15, 2011; Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Security Forces and Elite Divisions,” January 2026; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
[17]“Desertions, Shortages and Army-IRGC Rift Strain Iran’s Military,” Iran International, March 12, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603127596.
[18] Council of the European Union, “EU Terrorist List: Council Designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terrorist Organisation,” press release, February 19, 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/19/eu-terrorist-list-council-designates-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-as-a-terrorist-organisation/; Reuters, reporting on EU and Ukraine IRGC designations, February 2026; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026, February 2026. See also “Iran and the Midterms,” The Economist, March 21, 2026, https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/54390-tightening-2026-midterms-donald-trump-iran-march-20-23-2026-economist-yougov-poll.
[19] Akbar Ganji, “The New Khamenei: How America and Israel Solved Iran’s Succession Problem,” Foreign Affairs, March 13, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/new-khamenei; “Iran Names Mojtaba Khamenei as New Supreme Leader after Father’s Killing,” Al Jazeera, March 8, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/iran-names-khameneis-son-as-new-supreme-leader-after-fathers-killing-2.
[20]“Israel Expands Invasion of Southern Lebanon – as It Happened,” The Guardian, March 29, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/mar/29/middle-east-crisis-live-explosions-tehran-yemen-houthis-iran-war-updates-trump-us-israel-strikes-lebanon; IISS, “Iran Strike Assessment,” Strategic Comments, March 2026; The New York Times, reporting on militia strikes in Iraq, March 1–2, 2026.
[21] Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Foreign Militias’ Role in Protest Crackdown,” January 2026; Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 110–115.
[22] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Iran Oil Exports and Sanctions,” 2025–26; Jorge Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978); Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with Iran,” timeline, https://www.cfr.org/timelines/us-relations-iran.
[23] Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/421 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/420, February 19, 2026, formally designating the IRGC under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, which triggers the freezing of all funds and financial assets or economic resources held within EU member states and prohibits EU operators from making funds or economic resources available to the group; U.S. Department of State, designation of the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, April 2019; Ukraine designation, February 2026; see also Matthew Levitt, “The EU Can, and Should, Designate the IRGC as a Terrorist Group,” Lawfare, February 8, 2023, for the legal framework under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.
[24] Israel Expands Invasion of Southern Lebanon – as It Happened,” The Guardian, March 29, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/mar/29/middle-east-crisis-live-explosions-tehran-yemen-houthis-iran-war-upddates-trump-us-israel-strikes-lebanon; House of Commons Library, “US-Israel Strikes on Iran: February/March 2026,” Research Briefing, March 2026.
[25] Reuters, reporting on assurances relayed by American intermediaries and subsequent Iranian denials, January 2026; see also Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
[26] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 198–200; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 143–172.
[27] Farzeen Nasri, “Iranian Studies and the Iranian Revolution,” World Politics 35, no. 4 (1983), 628.
[28] Nasri, “Is a Revolution in Iran on the Horizon?”
[29] Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, chap. 1, 8–9; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 47–52, 196–198.
[30] Iran’s Exiled Crown Prince Rises as a Figure in Protests, Decades After Leaving His Homeland,” The Washington Post, January 10, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/09/iran-protests-crown-prince-reza-pahlavi/; Iran’s Exiled Crown Prince Touts Himself as Future Leader. Is This What Iranians Want?” Times of Israel, https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-exiled-crown-prince-touts-himself-as-future-leader-is-this-what-iranians-want/
[31] Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, 45–48; Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena,” 265–268.
[32] Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 120–125; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 488–493; Jack Goldstone, “States, Parties, and Social Movements in Revolutionary Contexts,” Comparative Politics 12, no. 3 (1980): 301–330
[33] IISS, “Iran Strike Assessment,” Strategic Comments, March 2026; House of Commons Library, “US-Israel Strikes on Iran: February/March 2026,” Research Briefing, March 2026; “Iran’s Supreme Leader Killed in U.S.-Israeli Attack,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/01/iran-succession-supreme-leader-khamenei/; Amnesty International, “Iran: Civilian Impact of Military Strikes,” March 2026 (documenting civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction); House of Commons Library, “US-Israel Strikes on Iran: February/March 2026,” Research Briefing, March 2026 (documenting infrastructure damage); Kay Armin Serjoie, “Iranians Say Trump’s Intervention Brought Destruction, Not Liberation,” Time, March 10, 2026, https://time.com/article/2026/03/10/iran-war-trump-us-israel-regime/.
Leave a Reply